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Abstract
Several studies have shown that birth order and the sex of siblings may have an inuence on
individual behavioral traits. In particular, it has been found that second brothers (of older male
siblings) tend to have more disciplinary problems. If this is the case, this should also be shown
in contact sports. To assess this hypothesis we use a dataset from the South Rugby Union (URS)
from the region of Bahía Blanca, Argentina, and information obtained by surveying more than four
hundred players of that league. We nd a statistically signicant positive relation between being a
second-born male rugby player with an older male brother and the number of yellow cards received.
Keywords: Birth Order; Behavior; Contact Sports; Rugby.
1 Introduction
At the beginning of the 20th century, Alfred Adler suggested that birth order inuences personality. Adler
(1928) believed that the rstborn would enjoy the full attention of the new parents until the arrival of a
new child, that would cause him a feeling of dethronement. He considered that the rstborn would be
the most likely to be neurotic, dutiful and sometimes conservative. He also found that lastborn siblings
are more ambitious, while middle children are characterized by emotional stability, as a result of what he
considered to be the optimal position in the family.
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Since then there have been numerous studies on birth order eects, both addressing or refuting Adler's
claims. A study by Howart (1980) of 142 male and 170 female undergraduates found signicant relation-
ships of low anxiety and higher ego in rstborns. On the contrary, Damian and Roberts (2015a) in a
study which included more than 370, 000 high school students , concluded that the importance of birth
order in shaping personality is generally exaggerated.
The debate has not abated. Black et al. (2018) show that rstborn children are more likely to become
managers and ll positions requiring leadership and social ability as well as Big Five personality traits.
Esposito et al.(2020) nd that the birth order has a negative eect on the educational outcomes in Mex-
ico, and furthermore, that the advantage of rstborns increases if they are male, in particular when the
other siblings are female. Birth order is, thus, a seemingly relevant factor for the explanation of human
behavior, although its actual relevance is still under discussion.
In this paper we take up from a recent study, based on the analysis of large databases on the life records
of individuals in Florida and Denmark, showing that the being a second-born male child has an impact
on delinquent behavior (Breining et al. 2020). The evidence indicates that males with an older brother
tend to engage in more unruly and undutiful acts. We speculate that such behavior should be evidenced
in the specic context of contact sports. Players that are second brothers should exhibit, in average, a
large tendency to incur oenses. If so, those players should exhibit a larger record of yellow and red cards.
To evaluate this claim we use data on more than 400 male players of the dierent teams that play in
the South Rugby Union (Unión de Rugby del Sur - URS), Argentina. We use information drawn from
the records of the 2019 season of the local and regional championships as well as from a questionnaire
asking information about the position of the players in the birth order of their families.
Based on this evidence we show that, indeed, it is the case that second born male players with male
older brother, tend to commit a statistically signicant larger number of oenses.
The plan of this article is as follows. In Section 2 we briey discuss the literature on the inuence of
birth order on behavior and we describe the essential features of rugby that are relevant for this study.
In Section 3 we introduce the database on which we run our analysis and describe how it was collected.
Section 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the research variables. Section 5 describes the methodology
used while Section 6 presents its results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
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2 Birth order, behavior and sports
The relevance of birth order as a psychological variable has been discussed for decades, but no denite
impact on behavioral traits were found at the early stage of those investigations. So for instance, while
rstborns were shown to exhibit higher levels of conformity and need for achievement (Forer, 1977), other
relevant variables that could also explain this were not explored. Reviews by Ernst and Angst (1983) and
Dunn and Plomin (1990) found little reliable evidence of this relations: [birth] order does not appear to
be a very strong inuence in molding personality in a denable way (Ernst and Angst 1983). Damian
and Roberts (2015b), in their PNAS paper, claimed that the study conducted by Rohrer et al (2015),
has nally put an end to the debate and conclude that birth order has no eects on personality traits.1
In a very inuential book, Sulloway (1996) acknowledged that even if birth order eects could be
subtle, they could be detected in very large samples. While his results were controversial, this opened the
door for further studies on issues like the inuence of birth order on early smoking (Bard and Rodgers
2006), competitive preferences (Okudaira et al. 2015) or on intelligence (Damian and Roberts 2015a). A
long term study showed that birth order has an impact on dierences in health and educational attain-
ment of older and younger siblings (Barclay and Kolk 2018).
A common nding in those studies is a slight but statistically signicant dierence between rst and
laterborns. In particular, the latter tend to exhibit worse results than rstborns.2 Breining et al. (2020)
carried out the largest study, using lifelong data from people of diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds
in Denmark (N > 400, 000) and the state of Florida (N > 1, 000, 000), detecting that second brothers
tend to exhibit a higher level of delinquent behavior. One of the main possible explanations is that the
dierence resides in the time devoted by parents to their rstborn children in comparison to that spent
in their younger siblings. Interestingly, this does not seem to be as marked when either the older or the
youngest child is a girl.
This leads us to the immediate conclusion that this eect should manifest in contact sports, in which
there are numerous opportunities for wrongdoing. While there are dierent sports in which this eect
could be at play, in some of them (soccer, for instance), the impact of birth order may be dicult to
isolate and be confounded by cultural and socio-economic dierences, that may also lead to aggressive
behavior (Miguel et al. 2008).3 To avoid those confusions we decided to study how this eect plays out in
1Rohrer et al (2015) analyzed a sample of size N = 5, 240 in the United States, N = 4, 489 in Great Britain and
N = 10, 457 in Germany. They found a slight birth order eect on intelligence but no consistent evidence of eects on
extroversion, emotional stability, agreeableness, conscientiousness or imagination.
2As for instance starting to smoke at an early stage; being overweight, etc.
3In their study, they nd a strong relationship between the history of civil conict in the home country of a player and
his propensity to behave violently in the soccer eld, as measured by yellow and red cards.
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a sport in which the background of the players is more culturally homogeneous and relatively prosperous.
For this reason we have chosen rugby, a game played in Argentina by middle and upper-class people of
European-inuenced culture (Bautista Branz 2016).
In rugby, players are classied in two big groups, the forwards and the backs. Traditionally, the
forwards are the players that seek to get the possession of the ball while the backs are the ones that score
tries. Forwards are usually heavy players, with strength to dispute the ball, while backs are light players,
with speed to score tries. The key features of a good rugby match are the fair contest for the ball and
the continuity of the game. Every action that attempts against these two key features, the security of
the players or the values of the game (integrity, discipline and respect) is punished. When an oense
committed by a player is serious, a yellow or red card is shown to him. Every foul play like punching,
kicking, spitting, etc, is usually penalized with a yellow or red card (penalizing actions against security
and values). Another oense that is penalized with a card, is when a player or a team infringes the rules
many times or when their infringement prevents the other team to score a try (penalizing actions against
fair contest and continuity). Of these kind of infringements, some of them can be considered as caused
by risk-taking behavior, because the action per se is not an infringement and depends on the outcome.4
A typical situation where many oenses occur is the breakdown.5 In a rugby game can happen from 100
to 150 breakdown situations and many players are involved in them, specially the forwards. That is why
many of the oenses in a rugby game happen in this context.6
Therefore, a yellow or a red card indicates, in increasing degree, that a player has failed to act accord-
ing to the values of the game and can be seen as a sign of unruly behavior (Romand and Pantaleón 2007).
In some cases a yellow card indicates a risk taking behavior of that player, which is also an undutiful
action.
The literature presents several studies on birth order and sports that are in line with our hypothesis.
Nisbett (1968) showed that rstborns were less likely than laterborns to participate in three sports that
he considered to be dangerous: football, soccer and rugby. Theroux (1993) conducted a study on more
than 190, 000 college freshmen in the United States and found that laterborns were more likely than
rstborns to win a varsity letter in high school and also spend more time discussing about sports with
their friends. She suggested that to counter the rstborn academic progeniture, the laterborn cultivates
athletic ability. This nding reects the well-documented tendency of the rstborn to be the one occu-
4An example can be when a player tries to intercept a pass. If he gets the ball, the game continues; but if he touches it
and the ball goes forward, an infraction is noted, which usually ends with the referee showing a yellow car to that player.




pying the niche of the achievement oriented, studious sibling (Sulloway 2007).
A particularly relevant study is Sulloway and Zweigenhaft (2010). They conducted a meta-analysis of
24 studies relating birth order and participation in dangerous sports, nding that it is more probable that
laterborns engage in them than rstborns. They also analyze (with a within-family design experiment)
performance data on 700 brothers that played baseball in the US major leagues. Professional baseball
presents a detailed statistical record and oers a variety of performance categories reecting behavioral
dierences in skill, self-control, risk taking, and performance. They concluded that younger brothers were
more likely to engage in the risky business of stealing bases.
Dierent mechanisms have been postulated as explanations for why laterborns may adopt more ag-
gressive conduct or risk taking behavior. Becker (1960, 1973, 1976) proposed a model that reconciles
fertility and parental investment in children. The so called quantity-quality trade o states a negative
correlation between the number of children and their parents income originating from the rising marginal
cost of quality with respect to quantity.
Hotz and Pantano (2015) argue that parents, intending to send signals to younger children, may
apply more intense monitoring and discipline on the oldest child. Sulloway (1996) speculates that, in
order to gain parental attention, rst born children may be more likely to emulate and obey their parents.
Because of this, younger siblings have to consider unconventional alternatives in order to gain parental
favor. Puer and Serrano (1973) have shown that laterborns generally have higher mortality rate in
various Latin American countries. This has also been documented in developed countries (Hertwig et al.
2002). This leads to laterborns to incur in more risks, as the costs of risk taking are reduced whenever
life expectancy is reduced (Daly and Wilson 1988)(Wang et al. 2009). A nal possible explanation is that
laterborns may assume greater risks to establish alliances with peers as part of a strategy to compensate
for receiving less parental investment (Salmon and Daly 1998)(Sulloway 1996)(Wang et al. 2009).
3 Data
The data for this research has been collected from the 2019 records (i.e. data on a single year) of the
South Rugby Union (URS) of Argentina and from the answers to a survey conducted by the URS on
the family structure and education of the players. We will discuss these two sources and the information
extracted from them.
The URS provided us the following data about the players: full name, club membership, date of birth,
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height, weight, position on eld and yellow and red cards record from the 2019 season. This information
was later matched to the responses given by each player to a survey7. The questions asked to them gave
us the following additional information: years playing rugby, educational attainment, birth order and
siblings gender.
The URS is a medium level amateur league, where the only requisite for any one interested in play-
ing is the willingness to train and agree to the rules. This give us the opportunity to conduct the
survey in an environment where every respondent has sought and found a team in which to play. So,
no player has been left aside or discarded by his team because of the quality of his skills. It is also an
environment where players share, in general, a homogeneous cultural, social and economical background.8
The survey was sent to the coaches of the teams, and given by them to their players. Answering it
was not mandatory, and the devolution rate was of around 60% (415 completed surveys out of 698 senior
players).9 The respondents were all male amateur rugby players of ages 18+ playing in the local and
regional tournaments recorded in the URS database. These players belonged to 21 dierent clubs from
the South of the province of Buenos Aires, the East of La Pampa and the North of Río Negro.
We decided to not consider the answers of a few younger players under 18. The main reasons for this
decision are two. First, most coaches were reluctant to send out the questionnaire to underage players,
and thus we did not get enough useful data. The second reason is that in the junior competitions in which
younger players participate, the refereeing is not strict. In these matches, even if a player may deserve
a yellow or red card, he may not be shown one. So, referees do not respond with the same severity to
similar actions in junior and senior games. For example, in rst division matches, repeated infringements
are shown a yellow card, while in junior level games the same situation will usually lead the referee to
give a talk to the players as to convince them to change their behavior.10 11
4 Descriptive statistics
In Table 1 we can see the main statistical description obtained by combining the URS database from
the 2019 season with the survey answers.12 We use two main indicator variables to answer our research
7The survey questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1.
8This information was obtained by asking the URS president, Martín Azpiroz. The questions and his answers can be
found in Appendix 2.
9We only consider the complete surveys, i.e., the ones with all the questions answered in the right format.
10This information was obtained by asking the URS Referee Manager, Juan Vigier. The questions and his answers can
be found in Appendix 2.
11The records conrm this: 524 cards were given in 288 rst division games (1.81 cards per game), while only 187 cards
in 970 youth division games (0.19 cards per game).
12We used Gretl (http://gretl.sourceforge.net/) to run the statistical analyses in this article.
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question, Code 1 and Code2. The rst one has value 1 if the player is a second born boy with an older
male brother and 0 otherwise. Code2 is also a dummy variable indicating whether or not a player is a
second born boy but with an older sister.
We decided to consider only yellow cards because very few red cards are recorded in the database, as
seen in the 0.0169 mean value of the red cards variable in Table 1.13 The database is further completed
with contextual information, such as club membership, educational attainment (incomplete secondary ed-
ucation, complete secondary school, incomplete college or completed tertiary education), height, weight
and position (forward or back). This extra information is used to dene dierent indicator variables for
control purposes in our regressions.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max Observations
Age 25.9 25.0 6.47 18.0 50.0 415
Yellow Cards 0.667 0.000 1.06 0.000 8.00 415
Red Cards 0.0169 0.000 0.129 0.000 1.00 415
Weight 90.0 88.0 17.1 51.0 145.0 310
Height 1.77 1.78 0.0675 1.55 1.98 310
Code 1 0.186 0.000 0.389 0.000 1.00 415
Code 2 0.116 0.000 0.320 0.000 1.00 415
We focus in this section on the variables that, as will be shown in the next section, are statistically
relevant. That is, we will here give a description of the distribution of the number of yellow cards received,
the dummy variables corresponding to birth order and the weight of players, as indicated in Table 1.
In Figure 1 we can see the distribution of the total number of yellow cards, i.e. the number of
players with 0, 1, . . . up to 8 cards. The left panel corresponds to the players that are not second born
boys (Code1=Code2=0), while the middle one to those who are second born boys with an older brother
(Code1=1) and the right one to those who are second born boys with an older sister (Code2=1).
We can see in the middle panel that the proportion of one and two yellow cards with respect to 0
cards, is much larger than in the cases of the left and the right panel. Furthermore, these two panels
show similar distributions.
13For robustness purposes, we ran the same regressions with a slightly dierent dependent variable consisting of the sum
of yellow and red cards. The results, reported in Table 8, are quite similar. This is not surprising, given the scarcity of red
cards in the database (only 7 in total).
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An interesting collateral result is the relation between being a second born boy and the weight vari-
able, as we can see in Figure 2. The middle panel corresponding to second born boy with an older
brother (Code 1= 1), shows a higher median, more skewed to the right, in comparison to the bottom,
not being a second born boy (Code 1=Code 2= 0) and top boxplot, being a second male child with an
older sister(Code 2= 1).
Figure 1: Number of yellow cards (x-axis) and number of cases in the database (y-axis).




















(a): not second born boy ; (b): second born boy with an older brother; (c): second born boy with an
older sister
In Figure 2 we can see that the median weight corresponding to being a second born boy is larger (93
kilograms) than that of the other groups, with a wider inter-quartile range, indicating a larger dispersion.
We can see the relation between the number of Yellow Cards received by a player and his (declared)
Weight in Figures 3a and 3b, indicating a positive relation between the weight of players and the number
of yellow cards they receive, although at the largest weights (very few cases) this relation is lost.
Finally, we test for the variables of interest the dierences between means, as reported in Table 2.
We can see, rst, that there exists a signicant dierence between the mean of Yellow Cards for a second
born boy with an older brother (an average of 1 card), and the 0.59 mean of the rest of the sample. The
second test shows, despite the evidence of the boxplot for medians, that when we test the dierence of
means of Weight under Code 1= 1, against the rest of the sample, there are no signicant dierences.
Finally, in the third test, we compare the mean weight of the players that did not get yellow cards with
that of those who got at least 1 yellow card. The statistically signicant dierence is of almost 4 kilograms.
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Figure 2: Box Plot of Weight.








Note: top: second born boy with an older sister; middle: second born boy with an older brother; bottom:
not a second born boy










































Y = -2.98 + 0.0703X - 0.000307X^2
(b) Quadratic relation.
In the data set there are 15 pairs and 1 trio of brothers. Each of these family groups plays in the same
team. In Table 3 we show the data on the number of yellow cards for them. The number of observations
does not yield signicant dierences between second male brothers and the rest of them.
5 Methodology
Our main hypothesis, as indicated above can be stated as:
the number of yellow cards must be larger for Code 1 players.
In other words, we will test for the validity of the claim that second born males with an older brother
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Table 2: Mean tests
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
Mean: Yellow Cards Weight Weight
Condition:
Code 1= 1 vs. Code 1= 1 vs. Yellow Cards= 0 vs.
Code 1= 0 Code 1= 0 Yellow Cards> 0
Mean (group 1)
n 77 n 53 n 163
mean 1.00 mean 89.1509 mean 88.1472
sd 0.13 sd 2.14435 sd 1.42932
Mean (group 2)
n 338 n 257 n 147
mean 0.5917 mean 90.1673 mean 92.0408
sd 0.0555 sd 1.08896 sd 1.28824
Two tails p-value 0.002271 0.6949 0.04558
One tail p-value 0.001135 0.3474 0.02279
Note: n: number of observations; sd: standard deviation.
Table 3: Number of Yellow cards of brother's teammates by Code Variable




will tend to commit more oenses. To evaluate this hypothesis we run a series of regressions of the form:
Y ellow Cardsi = β0 + β1Code 1 i + β2Code 2 i + Γxi + εi (1)
in which our coecients of interest are β1 and β2, varying a vector of control variables x. Table 6 sum-
marizes the results of these regressions.
Given that our dependent variable, Yellow Cards, is a counting variable, we will also take this partic-
ular feature into account, modeling the relation both as a Poisson regression and as a negative binomial
regression. As pointed out by Orme (2009), Hilbe (2011) and Cameron and Trivedi (2013), it is intuitive




, yi = 0, 1, 2, . . . (2)
where the mean is expressed as follows:
E [yi|xi] = µi = exp (x′iβ) (3)
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We adjust the observations to this distribution using a Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimation with























where (yi − µi)2 = ωi, is the weighing factor.
An important assumption in the case of Poisson distributions is that the variance equals the mean.
A χ2 test yields that the assumption of equality between the mean and the variance is not valid. Thus,
we have to drop the assumption of a single parameter, resorting to a negative binomial regression, by
including a parameter of overdispersion, α, where α > 0 (in a Poisson model, α = 0).
Given α, the term weighting the variance and covariance matrix is:
ωi = µi + αµ
p
i (5)
If p = 1 the model is called Negative Binomial 1 (NB1), and if p = 2, Negative Binomial 2 (NB2).
Since we do not have an a priori model of the generation of yellow cards we just take the results obtained
up to this point and choose to work with the NB2 and NB1 models and compare the AIC information
criteria.14 In the rightmost columns of Table 7 we report the general results with this last model, where:
E [Y ellowi|xi] = exp(β0 + β1Code 1 i + β2Code 2 i + β3Weighti) (6)
6 Regression results
In the rst column of Table 6 we report the results of running the standard OLS with no controls. We
can see that being the second male child with an older brother or the second male child with an older
sister (Code 1 and Code 2 ) yield results that can be expected according to our hypothesis, positive and
negative respectively. Not surprisingly, the Breush-Pagan test indicates the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity (Non-constant Variance Score Test with χ2 = 6.965588, p = 0.0083092), while a Cook-distance
test reveals the presence of inuential observations in the simple regression. Due to these evidence, we
rened our analysis. We did so by applying two strategies: by considering White's robust errors and by
clustering the variance and covariance matrices.
In columns 2 − 5 of Table 6 we can see the robust error regression results, with dierent controls
14A non-linear specication of the ωis is better at capturing ner distinctions in the data.
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added. The main result in these cases is that Code 2 loses signicance in columns 3 and 4, but we nd
a signicant and positive eect of the player's weight on the resulting number of yellow cards (although
with a very small coecient). Another variable that shows a signicant eect is the Incomplete Secondary
School dummy.
The last two columns show the results of running the regressions with a clustered error, based on
the variable indicating to which club the player belongs. This is in order to capture the intuition that
teammates tend to show similar styles of play (sharing a common coach). The results were, again, the
expected under the hypothesis.
The general results of the Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions can be seen in the appendix in
Table 7. Table 4 and Figures 4a and 4b present the results of this model with our variables of interest.
Table 4: Negative Binomial Regression Results (p = 2)
Coecient Standard Deviation z p-value
Constant −1.80345 0.439240 −4.106 0.0000
Weight 0.0162847 0.00468983 3.472 0.0005
Code 1 0.409718 0.173700 2.359 0.0183
Code 2 −0.545480 0.295712 −1.845 0.0651
α 0.540983 0.177833 3.042 0.0023
Observations 310
AIC criteria 736.9341
Note: Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Standard Errors.








































We can see that being a second born boy with an older brother (Code 1), being a second born boy
with an older sister (Code 2), Weight and the overdispersion coecient α are all statistically signicant.
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Figure 4a shows that the linear model leaves many actual values of Yellow Cards far from the predicted
ones, resulting in Figure 4b, that indicates that most of the residuals are below the normal, being their
distribution skewed to the right as a result of the overdispersion.
To ensure the robustness of our results, we run this nal model with an NB1 specication. The results
can be seen in Table 5. The only dierence found is that Code 2 is not signicant. Nonetheless, if we
take into account the Akaike information criteria (AIC), the NB2 model, as expected, adjusts better to
our data.
Table 5: Negative Binomial Regression Results (p = 1)
Coecient Standard Deviation z p-value
Constant −1.44833 0.409263 −3.539 0.0004
Weight 0.01233238 0.00431164 2.858 0.0043
Code 1 0.446600 0.164477 2.715 0.0066
Code 2 −0.481741 0.318358 −1.513 0.1302
α 0.429182 0.156938 2.735 0.0062
Observations 310
AIC criteria 738.7830
Note: Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Standard Errors.
In Table 8 at the end of Appendix 3, we report other specications where we control the results of
being a second born boy with an older brother (Code 1) and being a second born boy with an older
sister (Code 2) with the number of siblings. This last variable is not signicant while Code 1 remains as
signicant as in our previous analyses. In turn, Code 2 loses signicance.
We also tested two dierent specications capturing more specic data on birth order. On one hand,
we introduce a variable Brothers3+, indicating whether a player is or not born after the second brother.
The second specication incorporates eight dummies (collectively denotes DummiesBrothers), indicating
the specic position in the birth order of a player that is not rst born. Both variables are not signicant.15
Finally, there exists the possibility that being the second born boy with and older brother may be
correlated withWeight, according to the ndings of Meller et al. (2018), who nd that birth order has also
an impact on the health of second brothers. We run thus a Hausman test of endogeneity , instrumenting
15This result is interesting in the light of the possible explanation for the higher tendency to risk taking by second born
brothers introduced by Sulloway and Zweigenhaft (2010), namely the eect of a regression to the mean. That is, that second
brothers with lesser athletic skills than their older brothers, trying to live up to the expectation that they are at a par with
them, take more risks. In our case, if this were indeed so, younger brothers should also exhibit more yellow cards than their
older brother. The lack of signicance of Brothers3+ shows that this is not the case.
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Weight with Height. The latter variable is chosen as instrument since its correlation coecient with
Weight is 0.44565732, which allows to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation (t(308) = 8.73684, with
a two tails p-value of 0.0000). Then, the Hausman test yields χ2 = 0.02, and thus the null hypothesis of
exogeneity cannot be rejected, validating the results reported in table 4.
7 Conclusions
In this work we established a signicant relation between birth order, the sex of siblings and the behavior
in a contact sport (rugby) in a socially and culturally homogeneous setting. Second born boys with older
brothers tend to receive more yellow cards than boys with older sisters or ones that are not second born.
This result is consistent with the ndings of Breining et al. (2020).
While our analysis is not aimed to check which mechanism may explain the observations, our evidence
indicates that an alternative explanation of the close association between being the second male child and
a certain form of unruly behavior does not yield signicant results with our data. Namely, the possibility
of a regression to the mean eect, conjectured in Sulloway and Zweigenhaft (2010), seems to not be at
play in the setting analyzed here. Nevertheless, the fact that we are only considering the performance of
amateur players in a single year may in a certain sense obscure the impact of a regression to the mean.
Be as it may, our results might be relevant for designing new policies in sports training. Coaches of
child and junior teams should put more attention to the behavior of second born players, being alert to
possible misbehaviors and helping them to learn how to control themselves.
A secondary result is the existence of a positive impact of weight on the number of yellow cards. This
might be a consequence of the fact that heavy players usually play as forwards, who are more involved
in breakdowns, where most of the oenses are committed.
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Appendix 1: Survey on family structure of rugby players.
• First and Last Name
• Age
• Club
• How many years have you been playing rugby? (if you started this year write 0)
• Educational Attainment
 Incomplete Secondary Studies
 Complete Secondary Studies
 Incomplete College Studies
 Complete College studies
• How many siblings do you have?
• Enumerate your and your siblings order of birth, indicating gender, from the oldest to the youngest?
(In the positions corresponding to you, write Me). For example: 1.Brother 2. Me 3. Sister
19
Appendix 2: Email questionnaire
In the email questionnaire, the South Rugby Union President was required to put an X next to the
answers he picked.16
• Rugby in the URS is:
 Amateur X
 Professional






• How much do you agree with the following statements?:
 Everyone older than 18 years old can nd a rugby team in the URS, no matter its skills.
∗ Really agree X
∗ Agree
∗ Do not agree
 Player in the URS, generally shares several cultural characteristics.
∗ Really agree X
∗ Agree
∗ Do not agree
 The URS teams have an homogeneous social and economic level..
∗ Really agree
∗ Agree X
∗ Do not agree
In the email questionnaire, the South Rugby Union Referee Manager was required to put an X next




• How much do you agree with the following statements?:
 Junior rugby referees are usually new referees.
∗ Really agree
∗ Agree X
∗ Do not agree
 Junior rugby referees prefer to be more pedagogical and show less yellow cards that are usually
shown in a seniors game.
∗ Really agree
∗ Agree X
∗ Do not agree
21
Appendix 3: Regression Results
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